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The state filed a response at 12 noon today, but the 
Clerk's office did not provide this office with a copy. I 
(II appologize for this inconvenience. 
The State opposes a stay. There is no support in the record 
for applicants' contention that the funds held in escrow for 1975-1977 
would not be returned if this Court ultimately reverses the judgment 
of the 3-JC. Also, the state contends that there is no obligation to 
return funds disbursed pursuant to an Act ultimately held to be 
unconstitutional if there has been reliance upon an initial determin-
ation of constitutionality, Lemon v. Kurtzamn, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
Further, applicants did not act promptly in docketing an appeal. 
Discussion: The position of the S:ate at least appears internall: 
inconsistent, and it would have been useful to know the amount held in 
escrow. However, a stay does not appear justified on the facts now 
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Application of Committee for 
Public Education for Stay 
Presented to Justice Marshall 
and by him Referred to the Court 
SUMMARY: Applicants' constitutional challenge to N.Y. aid to 
private schools was dismissed by a 3-JC (USDC, SD, N.Y.) {Mansfield, 
Lasker; Ward dissenting). The court stayed reimbursement to private 
schools until April 3 {providing that funds claimed for reimbursement 
be placed in escrow) and directed the parties to apply to this Court 
either to vacate or extend the stay. Applicants ask for a stay pending 
review on appeal. 
FACTS: The N.Y. program of aid to private schools was found 
unconstitutional in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). N.Y. substantially amended its 
Act and again provided aid to private schools, Ch. 507 and 508 of the 
.... ~ . ..,,, - -- 2 -
1974 Laws of N.Y. The 3-JC found the amended N.Y. program unconstitu-
tional in Committee v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 (1976). This Court 
granted cert, vacated, and remanded in light of Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229 (1977), with three Justices voting to affirm. On remand, the 
3-JC sustained the N.Y. program 2 to 1. 
The present N.Y. Act provides direct payments to non-public schools 
for their actual costs in administering state prepared exams and comply-
ing with state reporting requirements. The records are kept and the 
tests administered pursuant to requirements of state law and regulation, 
for the purpose of determining whether or not the private schools are 
complying with compulsory attendance laws and providing an acceptable 
minimum standard of education for their pupils. 
Reimbursable costs include the portion of salaries and benefits 
- attributable to these state mandated activities, as well as the costs 
of supplies. Schools must maintain separate accounts, and are subject 
to audit before payment. 
-
The 3-JC described the state requ1red activities. The state 
requires three types of exams: (a) Standardized pupil examinations 
in various grades, containing multiple choice objective questions 
prepared by the state. These tests are graded by the school staff 
pursuant to state instructions. Grading is strictly mechanical. 
(b) Regents exams, given in 19 subjects. These tests are prepared 
by the state and contain primarily multiple choice objective questions, 
along with some essays. Grading is by the school staff pursuant to 
detailed state instructions. The state also audits a random sample 
of the papers. (c) Regents 5iholarship exams, which are prepared 
(.._., 
and graded by the state. 
- -
- 3 -
The statute also reimburses private schools for the cost of 
preparing informational reports required by state law. These reports 
contain information regarding the student body, faculty, staff, curricu-
lum and physical plant. Schools are also required to submit an annual 
attendance report for each minor student. 
*/ The cost to the state for reimbursements to private schools-
will be between $8 and l0 million a year. Between 85 and 95% of the 
total reimbursement is for costs attributable to attendance taking, 
almost all of which represents compensation to personnel needed for 
this purpose. The amounts paid for taking attendance are about 1 to 
5.4% of the total amount budgeted by the schools for salaries and 
fringe benefits. 
OPINION BELOW: The majority found that the statute manifests 
a secular legislative purpose, and that under Wolman the aid does not 
present an appreciable risk of being used to transmit religious views. 
Any aid to religious indoctrination is at best indirect and incidental, 
Nyquist. The statute does not foster religious education simply because 
it provides aid in cash rather than in kind, and state subsidization of 
attendance taking is not challengeable under Meek. Finally, the 
majority found no excessive state entanglement in the state administra-
tion of sectarian institutions. The dissent was of the view that the 
N.Y. Act was unconstitutional because it had a primary effect of 
advancing religion and fostered excessive governmental entanglement. 
CONTENTIONS: Unless the Court stays the mandate of the 3-JC, the 
funds provided by the challenged Act will be paid to sectarian schools. 
In the several prior cases, recipients of unconstitutional payments of 
state funds have not returned the money improperly paid to them. 
~/No indication is given as to how many private schools are church 
r elated, or the distribution of funds betwen sectarian and secular 
school s. The scope of the case, however, appears to be limited to sec-
tarian schools. 
~ . . ,.... ·, 
• 
- -- 4 -
Applicants argue that even if the Court declares the challenged Act 
unconstitutional, there is little likelihood that any funds will ever 
be returned or recovered by N.Y. On appeal, petrs will argue that 
the result 
Wolman does not require/reached by the court below, and the N.Y. Act 
violates the advancement and entanglement prohibitions of the First 
Amendment. 
DISCUSSION: On at least two previous occasions stays have been 
denied: Justice Blackrnun denied a stay in Levitt v. Committee, 413 
U.S. 472 (1973) (72-296); Justices Stewart and Marshall denied a stay 
in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (76-496). Applicants cite 
no occasion when a stay has been granted in a similar situation, and 
indeed they cite no authority for their request. 
Thus, under existing practice, a stay does not appear to be required 
- even if the Court is inclined to grant cert. 
There is no response. 
3/28/79 
PJC 
Marsel 3-JC op. in petn 
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~ rom SDNY (three- ~ j'cf-
~ ;urt) ( Mansfield, /' 
Lasker; Ward, dissents) 
( Com pt. of N. Y.) Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY. Appts argue that the three-judge court 
erred in concluding that a New York statute providing for 
certain oayments to private, sectarian schools does not violate 
- --------~-- -=-
the First Amendment. 
Tk ~ i's ~ h~ ~vy~ O"v-G-\ ~ ~ 
11-.J-~ ~ ~ -7;:;~~ ~ ~~~ ~ 





2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW. In Levitt v. Committee 
for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), this Court struck 
down, on First Amendment grounds, a New York statute providing 
for state financing of certain tests to be prepared by the 
,,,., .... -- ~ - - -teachers of sectarian schools and administered to the students 
of those schools. The legislature responded by enacting a new 
statute in 1974, which was designed to avoid the defects in the 
earlier law. Under chapter 507 of the 1974 Laws of New York, as 
amended by chapter 508, two kinds of payments are to be made to 
private schools in the state, including those with religious 
affiliations: (1) the schools are "reimbursed" for the expenses 
of completing attendance reports required by the state: and (2) 
reimbursement also is made for the costs of administering and 
grading certain standardized tests given to all students in the 
state. The tests are prepared by state employees. Most of them 
are strictly "objective" exams, with the scoring key provided by 
the state and applied, either automatically or by hand, by the 
schools. A few "essay" questions are involved. For these, the 
state provides detailed guidelines for grading the exams. 
Salaries and fringe benefits constitute the great bulk 
of reimbursable costs, although some expenses for necessary 
supplies, etc., also are included. Teachers and secretaries in 
the schools report what percentage of their time they spend on 
these state-required activities, and the state pays the 
corresponding portion of their salaries. Separate accounts are 





money found to have been paid in excess of actual costs incurred 
must be refunded immediately to the states • 
Following the enactment of this statute, petrs, who had 
been plaintiffs in Levitt, challenged its constitutionality. A 
three-judge court was convened under the law then in effect. 
The panel decided that the law was unconstitutional because its 
"primary effect" was to advance religion. The court relied 
heavily upon this Court's decision in Meek v. Pittinger, 421 
U.S. 349 (1975), which held that a state statute authorizing the 
loan of instructional material and equipment to private 
religious schools was unconstitutional. The Court said in Meek: 
"To be sure, the material and equipment that are 
the subjects of the loan -- maps, charts, and 
laboratory equipment, for example -- are 'self-
polic(ing], in that starting as secular, 
nonideological and neutral, they will not change 
in use.' ••• But faced with the substantial 
amounts of direct support authorized by [the law], 
it would simply ignore reality to attempt to 
separate secular educational functions from the 
predominantly religious role performed by many of 
Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and 
secondary schools and to then characterize [the 
law] as channeling aid to the secular without 
providing direct aid to the sectarian. Even 
though earmarked for secular purposes, 'when it 
flows to an institution in which religion is so 
pervasive that a substantial portion of its 
functions are subsumed in the religious mission,' 
state aid has the impermissible primary effect of 
advancing religion." Id., at 365-366. 
In its opinion below, the district court characterized 
its understanding of Meek as requiring that "in lieu of a case-





state aid might be sued for religious purposes, [the courts must 
apply] a per~ rule prohibiting any state aid to educational 
activities carried out in sectarian schools, except for the loan 
of textbooks to students, which was upheld in Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)." Since the court believed that 
the reimbursements for test administration and record-keeping 
constituted direct aid to the schools, its interpretation of 
Meek led to the conclusion that the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
The schools appealed to this Court, which vacated and 
remanded for reconsideration in light of Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229 (1977). Wolman involved a challenge to a complex Ohio 
statute providing for various kinds of assistance and services 
to private schools and their students. The court was badly 
divided over the constitutionality of the various provisions of 
the statute. One of those provisions was that the state would 
supply to the schools certain standardized tests which it had 
prepared in advance. It thereafter would score the exams after 
the students had taken them. No money payments were made to the 
schools. See Id., at 238-241. Although there was no 
controlling rationale, a majority of the Court agreed that this 
aspect of the Ohio law was constitutional. Mr. Justice 
Blackmun's plurality opinion noted that the private schools 
controlled neither the content of the tests nor their results. 
This distinguished the statute from that struck down in Levitt, 






There was "a court" in Wolman for the proposition that the loan 
of instructional materials to the private schools was 
unconstutional, even though the nominal bailees were the 
students and their teachers. The opinion quoted extensively 
from Meek in support of this result • 
On remand, the district court reversed its previous 
position, and held the New York law constitutional. It did not 
confess error in its previous reading of Meek, but concluded 
that Wolman signaled a retreat from the underlying principle of 
that decision: "Although Wolman does not expressly renounce 
Meek's theory that aid to a sectarian school's education 
activities is per se unconstitutional, it does revive the more 
flexible concept that state aid may be extended to such a 
school's educational activities if it can be shown with a high 
degree of certainty that the aid will only have secular value of 
legitimate interest to the State and does not present any 
appreciable risk of being used to aid transmission of religious 
views." 
The court concluded that, judged under this standard, 
the statute was constitutional: Since the State effectively 
controlled the content and results of the tests, they would not 
become the vehicle for sectarian influence or indoctrination. 
Although the New York testing law was different in some respects 
from the Ohio statute upheld in Wolman, the differences did not 
present First Amendment difficulties. The attendance-record 





a ministerial task lacking ideological content or use." 
Reimbursement of costs to the schools was permissible as long as 
the funds were identifed strictly with the clearly secular tests 
and record-keeping functions. No excessive entanglement was 
threatened because "[t]he services for which private schools are 
reimbursed are discrete and clearly identifiable. A teacher's 
taking of attendance, administration of examinations, or record-
keeping can hardly be confused with his or her other 
activities," and the careful auditing procedures employed by the 
State would catch errors or fraud in reimbursement claims 
without extensive, ongoing state supervision. 
Judge Ward dissented. He noted that the majority stuck 
by its earlier evaluation of the statute under Meek, and chose 
to rest its new holding solely on the premise that Wolman had 
changed the law. He believed this view of Wolman was untenable. 
This Court had given no hint in that case that it was 
dissatisfied with Meek~ to the contrary, it had quoted from the 
latter extensively. The approval of the provision in the Ohio 
law pertaining to the giving of standardized tests could be 
explained by the fact that no direct aid of any kind was 
involved there~ the State supplied the exams, corrected them, 
and made no payments to the schools for their administration. 
As long as state funds flowed directly to a religious school, 
the dissenter argued, the Meek principle was violated. In 
addition, he contended that attendance-taking was an essential 





their own in any event; thus, the state was financing an 
integral component of the schools' administrative program. 
Finally, he argued that the majority's holding would occasion 
excessive entanglement in religion: In order to be certain the 
teachers are not overstating the amount of time spent on 
reimbursable activities, and that the tests do not have 
religious content and are not used for religious purposes, 
continuing state scrutiny would be required. 
3. CONTENTIONS. The parties to this appeal line up 
directly behind the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
court below: Appts' argument tracks that of the dissent, and 
the state and certain private schools that intervened as 
defendants below reiterate the position of the majority • 
4. DISCUSSION. Like most others of its genre, this is 
a hard case. The discussions of both the majority and the 
dissent below concerning the likelihood that the New York 
statute will advance sectarian purposes or result in excessive 
entaglement with religion are plausible. The most important 
I 
point of disgreement on the court concerns the correct reading 
of W -----olman. The majority position that this Court has retreated 
from Meek seems dubious. Certainly the main opinion in Wolman 
does not explicitly suggest this, and the holding in that case 
as to the standardized tests is explained with considerable 
persuasion by the dissenter below. 
Although the majority chose not to rely on this theory, 





first opinion. As Mr. Justice Powell's concurring and 
dissenting opinion in Wolman points out, the Court never has 
followed to its logical extension the principle that all direct 
aid to a religious school is prohibited by the First Amfil}dment. 
=-= ~ -__ --,,, ,,,,,_., -
Thus, even if the district court misread Wolman, its final 
decision in this case is not necessarily wrong. 
Because this is an appeal, and because it involves an 
area of the law of great importance to the states, the Court 
should consider noting probable jurisdiction. 
4-18-79 
There are two motions to dismiss or affirm. 
Andersen op. in juris. 
statement • 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
Ap ri l 26, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 78-1369 - Comm. Pub. Ed. & Religious 
v. Re_g_an 
On the assumption that the Court will summarily 
affirm, I will add the following to the order: 
"For the reaso~s stated in his sepirate 
opinion i n Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 
264, Mr. Justice Stevens would reverse the 
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and Relig_i_Q_u~Liberty _v. R_egan 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 








PER CURIAM • . 
- '.ro : 
ThG Chi 01: JUB l, .~UQ 
Nr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Just ice Stewart 
Mr . Justice White 
Mr. Just ice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr . Just i ce Stevens 
r . Justice BlackJnun 
eQ.: . 2 J MAY 1979 
Recirculated: 
Education and Religious 
In 1973, this court declared that Chapter 138, 1970 N.Y. 
Laws, under which the State of New York reimbursed nonpublic 
schools for certain recordkeeping and testing costs, violated 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Levitt 
v. committee for Public Education, 413 u.s. 472 (Levitt I). In 
the case now before the court, the committee for Public 
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No•~ 78-1369 - -
- 2 -
Education, et al., appeal the judgment of a three-judge United 
States District Court that the successor statute to Chapter 
138, namely, Chapter 507, as amended by Chapter 508 (adding a 
severability provision), 1974 N.Y. Laws, which attempts to 
avoid the defects of Chapter 138 while providing reimbursement 
to nonpublic schools for similar costs, does not offend the 
Establishment Clause. Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123 (SDNY 1978) 
{Levitt I I I) • 
No: 78-1369 - -- - 3 -
I. 
Appellants, the Committee for Public Education and Religious 
Liberty and several of that organization's individual members, 
instituted this action in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York shortly after Chapters 507 and 
508 were enacted by the New York Legislature in 1974. 
Appellees, defendants below, are the State Comptroller and the 
State Commissioner of Education. One nonsectarian and four - sectarian private schools were permitted to intervene as 
defendants, and they also appear as appellees in this Court. 
Appellants sought a declaration that Chapter 507, like Chapter 
138, is unconstitutional, and an injunction against the use of 
public money under Chapter 507 for the support of religious 
schools. 
The procedural history of this appeal properly commences 
with the Court's decision in Levitt r. As noted, the Court 
·e there considered the validity of Chapter 138, 1970 N.Y. Laws, 
No. 78-1369 - -- - 4 -
under which $28,000,000 was appropriated to reimburse nonpublic 
schools for costs incurred in administering test~, maintaining 
pupil enrollment and health records, recording personnel data, 
and complying wi th certain state repor ting requirements. 413 
U.S., at 474. The statute required no audit of actual expenses 
to be reimbursed, nor did it provide for recoupment of 
reimbursement provided in excess of actual expenses for secula r 
. _:··>.::-:/;:~cti vi ties. 
This Court declared Chapter 138 unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause because the statute made no attempt, and no 
means were available, to assure that school-prepared tests for 
which reimbursement was available were free from religious 
instruction. Id., at 480. The Court held that the statute also 
was infirm because it provided aid to sectarian schools in the 
form of a lump sum payment for some services that were 
potentially religious without providing that this aid be limited 
- to "an amount corresponding to the actual costs incurred in 
performing reimbursable secular services." Id., at 482. 
No. 78-1369 - -- - 5 -
The New York Legislature responded to Levitt I by enacting 
Chapter 507, as amended by Chapter 508, in 1974. Chapter 507 
provides that nonpublic schools in New York will be reimbursed 
by direct cash payments for certain incurred expenses. Under 
the statute, nonpublic schools may seek payment for the actual 
cost to them of services "required by law to be rendered to the 
state in compliance with the requirements of the state's pupil 
evaluation piogram, the basic educational data system, regents - examinations, the statewide evaluation plan, the uniform 
procedure for pupil attendance reporting, and other similar 
state prepared examinations and reporting procedures." Chapter 
507, § 3. 
Basically, § 3 provides reimbursement for costs incurred in 
the two areas that had been covered by Chapter 138, 
recordkeeping and testing, while limiting more narrowly than 
Chapter 138 did the specific costs reimbursable. Recordkeeping 
- costs associated with fulfilling the State's requirement that 
No. 78-1369 - -- - 6 -
annual attendance reports be filed with the State for each pupil 
are reimbursable, as are costs incurred in submitting to the 
State a Basic Educational Data System report, containing 
information on the faculty, physical plant, students, and 
curriculum of the nonpublic school. 
Testing expenses are reimbursable only with regard to 
certain examinations. These examinations are (1) the Pupil 
Evaluation Program tests, administered in grades 3 and 6, and, - at the school's option, also in grade 9; (2) Regents 
end-of-the-course examinations administered in grades 9 through 
12; and (3) the Regents Scholarship and College Qualification 
Test (RSCQT), used to admit students to various units of the 
State University of New York and to award scholarships. All 
these tests are prepared by the State, though all are 
administered in the nonpublic schools by employees of those 
schools. The Pupil Evaluation Program tests and Regents 
- end-of-the-course examinations are graded by nonpublic school 
No. 78-1369 - -- - 7 -
personnel, though the State provides detailed instructions for 
both administration and grading of these tests. The Pupil 
Evaluation Program examinations are entirely objective 
multiple-choice tests, and may be graded by hand or machine. 
Regents end-of-the-course tests, on the other hand, though made 
up largely of objective questions with multiple choice answers, 
may contain essay questions or extended mathematical problems, 
- and so require the exercise of some degree of subjective judgment by the sectarian employee grading them. Nonpublic 
schools must submit all examination papers in certain subjects 
to the State for review after certain examinations, but submit 
only a random sample of papers for state review after other 
examinations. RSCQT examinations are scored by State employees. 
Costs that are reimbursable under Chapter 507 include 
proportionate shares of personnel salaries and fringe benefits 
attributable to the recordkeeping and testing covered by the 
'.- statute, as well as the cost of supplies and certain contractual 
No~ 78-1369 - -- - 8 -
expenditures, such as those for electronic data processing, 
associated with covered activities. In order to qualify for 
reimbursement, nonpublic schools must submit to the State an 
application and such additional information as may be 
requested. Ch. 507, § 4. Payment may be made only after the 
education commissioner audits the application and supporting 
materials to determine whether reimbursement is proper. Id., 
- §§ 6, 7. Schools seeking funds under Chapter 507 must maintain a separate accounting system for expenses incurred in rendering 
services for which reimbursement is provided, id.,§ 5, and the 
State is authorized to conduct periodic audits of these accounts 
to determine the cost to the school of rendering the services 
referred to in Chapter 507. Id., § 7. If an audit reveals that 
the school has received funds in excess of the actual cost of 
providing the specified services, the school must reimburse the 





No. 78-1369 - -
- 9 -
According to the evidence produced in the District Court, 
there are approximately 1,954 nonpublic schools in New York 
eligible for reimbursement under Chapter 507. Of these, 85% are 
religiously-affiliated schools de signed to provide an education 
in which religious instruction is integrated with secular 
education, and in which the teaching process · is largely devoted 
to religious inculcation.1/ 
The District Court found that between $8-$10 million ~ould 
be expended each year under Chapter 507, with most of this going 
to sectarian schools eligible for aid under the statute. Of 
this amount, it was estimated that 85%-95% would be paid for 
costs attributable to attendance-taking, of which all but a 
negligible portion would consist of compensation to personnel 
performing this service. The funds paid for personnel expenses 
incurred in attendance-taking would amount to approximately 1% 
to 5.4% of the budget of individual schools for salaries and 
fringe benefits. Levitt III, 461 F. Supp., at 1126. 
No. 78-1369 - -- - 10 -
II. 
A three-judge court wa s convened pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 
§§ 2281, 2283. Y The parties agreed to submit the case on 
the pleadings and the appe llees' answers to appellants' 
interrogatories. In its initial opinion, the District Court 
found Chapter 507, as amended, to violate the Establishment 
Clause. Committee for Public Education and Religious Libe rty v. 
- Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 (SDNY 1976) (Levitt II). In evaluating the statute, the court applied the three-part test, 
developed by this Court in Establishment Clause cases, which 
looks to determine whether the legislation has a secular 
purpose, whether it has a primary effect that enhances or 
inhibits religion, and whether it fosters government 
entanglement in religious affairs. The District Court 
unanimously concluded that, though the statute clearly had a 
secular purpose, it had the impermissible primary effect of 
e advancing religion. Applying the principles of this Court's 
No. 78-1369 - -- - 11 -
decision in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the 
three-judge court found that the direct payments provided by 
Chapter 507 to religious schools would have the effect of aiding 
the sectarian enterprise, since the reimbursable secular 
activities of testing and reporting covered by the statute were 
essential to the educational function of the religious schools 
as a whole. 414 F. Supp., at 1179-1180.l/ 
- On appeal, this Court, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the intervening decision in Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). On remand, a divided District 
Court, with Judge ward, the author of the court's opinion in 
Levitt II, dissenting, reversed its field and found that Chapter 
507, as amended, could withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny. 
Levitt III, 461 F. Supp. 1123 (SDNY 1978). It read Wolman v. 
Walter to have cut back on Meek v. Pittenger by "reviv[ing] the 
- more flexible concept that state aid may be extended to [a 
No. 78-1369 - -- - 12 -
sectarian] school's educational activities if it can be shown 
with a high degr e e of certainty that the aid will only have 
secular value of legitima te interest to the State and does not 
present any appreciable risk of being used to aid transmission 
of religious views." 461 F. Supp., at 1127. 
The District Court based this conclusion on its view that 
Wolman, by approving the Ohio policy of furnishing state-drafted 
- and state-graded examinations to religious schools, see 433 U.S., at 238-241 (plurality opinion), had rejected the concept 
that state support for the secular educational activities of 
sectarian schools necessarily advanced the religious mission of 
such schools. The court first found the aid for administering 
examinations provided for by Chapter 507 to be analogous to the 
examinations furnished by Ohio and at issue in Wolman. Though 
Chapter 507, unlike the statute at issue in Wolman, reimburses 
religious schools for examinations administered and graded by 
- sectarian personnel, the court concluded that the secular nature 
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of the examinations and the mechanical grading procedures 
precluded use of the examinations to inculcate religious views. 
And though Chapter 507, again unlike the statute in Wolman, 
involved direct cash payments to sectarian schools, the court 
held that so long as the payments were applied to purely secular 
activities, the religious mission of the schools was not 
advanced. The court then concluded that since attendance-taking 
• was purely ministerial in nature, state reimbursement for costs associated with such an activity did not have a primary effect 
of advancing religion. Finally, the court rejected the argument 
that Chapter 507 fostered excessive government entanglement in 
religious affairs, finding that the services to be reimbursed 
were clear and discrete and that any possibility of fraud or 
mistake would be rectified by the careful auditing procedures 
called for by the statute. 
-
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III. 
The District Court, of course, was correct in recognizing 
that the "mode of analysis for Establishment Clause questions 
is defined by the three-part test that has emerged from the 
Court's decisions." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S., at 235-236 
(plurality opinion). To pass constitutional muster under this 
test, Chapter 507 "must have a secular legislative purpose, 
- must have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster excessive government 
entanglement with religion." Id., at 236. 
We have no trouble in agreeing with the District Court that 
Chapter 507 manifests a clear secular purpose. See Levitt I., 
413 U.S., at 479 n.7. We therefoie evaluate Chapter 507 under 
the two remaining inquiries of the three-part test. 
In deciding whether Chapter 507 has an impermissible 
primary effect of advancing religion, or whether it fosters 
; - excessive government entanglement with sectarian affairs, we 
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must keep in focus the nature of the assistance prescribed by 
the New York statute. The District Court found that $8-$10 
million annually would be expended under Chapter 507, with the 
great majority of these funds going to sectarian schools to pay 
for personnel costs associated with attendance reporting. The 
court found that such payments would amount to from 1% to 5.4% 
of the personnel budget of an individual religious school 
- receiving assistance under Chapter 507. Moreover, Chapter 507 provides direct cash payments by the State of New York to 
religious schools, as opposed to providing services or 
providing cash payments to third parties who have rendered 
'• 
services. And the money paid sectarian schools under Chapter 
507 is designed to reimburse costs that are incurred by 
religious schools in order to meet basic state testing and 
reporting requirements, costs that would have been incurred 
regardless of the availability of reimbursement from the State. 
-
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This direct financial assistance provided by Chapter 507 
differs significantly from the types of state aid to religious 
schools approved by the Court in Wolman v. Walter. For 
example, we approve d in Wolman that portion of the Ohio statute 
that provided to religious schools the standardized tests and 
scoring services furnished to public schools. But, unlike New 
York's Chapter 507, Ohio's statute provided only the tests 
- themselves and scoring by employees of neutral testing organizations. It did not authorize direct financial aid of 
any type to religious schools. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S., at 
238-239, and n. 7 (plurality opinion). 
Similarly, the other forms of assistance upheld in Wolman 
did not involve direct cash assistance. Rather, the Court 
approved the State's providing sectarian school students 
therapeutic, remedial, and guidance programs administered by 
public employees on public property. It also approved certain 
i - public health services furnished by public employees to 
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religious school pupils, even though administered in part on 
the sectarian premises, on the basis of its recognition in a 
number of cases, see ~.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S., at 364, 
368 n.17, that provision of health services to all school 
children does not advance religion so as to contravene the 
Establishment Clause. 433 U.S., at 241-248. And it upheld the 
lending by Ohio of textbooks to pupils under the "unique 
- presumption," id., at 252 n_.18, created by Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and reaffirmed since that time. 
~, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S., at 359-362- (plurality 
opinion); id., at 388 (opinion concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
It is clear, however, that none of the programs upheld in 
Wolman provided direct financial support to sectarian schools. 
At the least, then, the judgment of the three-judge court in 
Levitt III went further in approving state assistance to 
- sectarian schools than this Court has gone in its Establishment 
No. 78-1369 - -
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Clause cases. But beyond merely failing to approve the type of 
direct financial aid at issue in this case, Wolman reaffirmed 
the finding of the Court in Meek v. Pittenger that direct aid 
to the educationa l function of religious schools necessarily 
advances the sectarian enterprise as a whole. Thus, the Court 
in Wolman invalidated Ohio's practice of loaning instructional 
materials directly to sectarian schools, "even though the loan 
- ostensibly was limited to neutral and secular instructional material and equipment, [because] it inescapably had the 
primary effect of providing a direct and substantial 
advancement of the sectarian enterprise." Wolman v. Walter, 
433 U.S., at 250. In the same vein, the Court disapproved 
Ohio's provision of field-trip transportation directly to 
religious schools as impermissible direct aid that, because of 
the pervasively religious nature of the schools involved, 
furthered the religious goals of the schools, and that also 
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degree as to foster entanglement of the State in religion. 
Id., at 252-255. 
Wolman thus reenforces the conclusion that substantial 
direct financial aid to a religious school, even though 
ostensibly for secular purposes, runs a great risk of 
furthering the religious mission of the school as a whole 
because that religious mission so pervades the functioning of 
the school. The Court recognized this in Meek: 
"[F]aced with the substantial amounts of direct 
support authorized by [the statute at issue], it 
would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate 
secular educational functions from the 
predominantly religious role performed by many 
••• church-related elementary and secondary schools 
and to then characterize [the statute] as 
channeling aid to the secular without providing 
direct aid to the sectarian. Even though 
earmarked for secular purposes, 'when it flows to 
an institution in which religion is so pervasive 
that a substantial portion of its functions are 
subsumed in the religious mission,' state aid has 
-
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the impermissible primary effect of advancing 
religion. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743." 
421 U.S., at 365-366. 
See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S., at 249-250; Committee 
for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781-783 
and n.39 (1973). 
Under the principles announced in these previous 
cases, we find that Chapter 507, by providing 
- substantial financial assistance directly to sectarian 
schools, has a primary effect of advancing religion. 
The vast majority of the schools aided under Chapter 
507 typify the religious-pervasive institution the 
very purpose of which is to provide an integrated 
secular and sectarian education. The aid provided by 
Chapter 507 goes primarily to reimburse such schools 
for personnel costs incurred in complying with state 
- reporting and testing requirements, costs that must be 
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incurred if the school is to be accredited to provide 
a combined sectarian-secular education to school-age 
pupils. To continue to function as religious schools, 
sectarian schools thus are required to incur the costs 
outlined in§ 3 of Chapter 507, or else lose 
accreditation by the State of New York. See,~' 
N.Y. Education Law§§ 3210, 3211 (McKinney 1970). 
- These reporting and testing requirements would be met by the schools whether reimbursement were available or 
not. As such, the attendance, informational, and 
testing expenses compensated by Chapter 507 are 
essential to the overall educational functioning of 
sectarian schools in New York in the same way 
instruction in secular subjects is essential. 
Therefore, just as direct aid for ostensibly secular 
purposes by provision of instructional materials or 
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Establishment Clause, so direct aid for the 
performance of recordkeeping and testing activities 
that are an essential part of the sectarian school's 
functioning also is interdicted. The Court stated in 
Meek, and reaffirmed in Wolman: 
"The very purpose of many [religious] sch6ols is to 
provide an integrated secular and religious 
education; the teaching process is, to a large 
extent, devoted to the inculcation of religious 
values and belief. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., 
at 616-617. Substantial aid to the educational 
function of such schools, accordingly, necessarily 
results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as 
a whole. '[T]he secular education those schools 
provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission 
that is the only reason for the schools' existence. 
Within the institution, the two are inextricably 
intertwined.' Id., at 657 (opinion of BRENNAN, 
J.)." 421 U.S., at 366, quoted at 433 U.S., at 
249-250. 
It is also true that the keeping of pupil attendance 
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schools. To ensure that the school is fulfilling its religious 
mission properly, it is necessary to provide a way to determine 
whether pupils are attending the sectarian classes required of 
them. Accord i ngly, Chapter 507 not only advances religion by 
aiding the educational mission of the sectarian school as a 
whole; it also subsidizes directly the religious mission of 
such schools. Chapter 507 makes no attempt, and none is 
possible, to separate the portion of the overall expense of 
attendance-taking attributable to the desire to ensure that 
students are attending religious instruction from that portion 
attributable to the desire to ensure that state attendance laws 
are complied with. This type of direct aid the Establishme nt 
Clause will not permit. Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S., at 774-780; Levitt I, 413 U.S., at 480. 
We thus hold that the aid provided by Chapter 507 
constitutes a direct subsidy of the operating costs of the 
sectarian school that aids the school as a whole, and that the 
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statute therefore directly advances religion in violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Beyond this, Chapter 507 also fosters government 
entanglement with religion to an impermissible extent. Unlike 
Wolman, under Chapter 507 sectarian employees are compensated 
by the State for grading examinations. In some cases, such 
grading requires the teacher to exercise subjective judgment. 
- For the State properly to ensure that this subjective judgment is not exercised to inculcate religion, a "comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will 
inevitably be required." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 
(1971}. 
I 
Moreover, Chapter 507 provides for continuing reimbursement 
with regard to examinations in which the questions may vary 
from year to year, and for examinations that may be offered in 
the future. This will require the State continually to 
- evaluate the examinations to ensure that reimbursement for 
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expenses incurred in connection with their administration and 
grading will not offend the First Amendment. This too fosters 
impermissible government involvement in sectarian affairs, 
since it is likely to lead to continuing adjudication of 
disputes between the State and others as to whether certain 
questions or new examinations present such opportunities for 
the advancement of religion that reimbursement for 
- administering and grading them should not be permitted. Cf. 
New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977}. 
Finally, entanglement also is fostered by the system of 
reimbursement for personnel expenses. The State must make sure 
that it reimburses sectarian schools only for those personnel 
costs attributable to the sectarian employees' secular 
activities described in§ 3 of Chapter 507. It is difficult to 
see how the State adequately may discover whether the time for 
which reimbursement is made available was devoted only to 
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the sectarian employees and religious schools at issue. It is 
this type of extensive entanglement the Establishment Clause 
forbids. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 617-621. 
We therefore conclude that Chapter 507 has a primary effect 
of advancing religion and also fosters excessive government 
entanglement with religion. The statute, consequently, is 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, at least to the extent it provides reimbursement 
directly to sectarian nonpublic schools. The judgment of the 
District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further -----
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 





No. 78-1369 - -
1/rn the District Court, appellees conceded that Chapter 
507 would provide reimbursement to schools that 
"(l) are controlled by churches or religious or-
ganizations, (2) have as their purpose the teach-
ing, propagation and promotion of a particular 
religious faith, (3) conduct their operations, 
curriculums and programs to fulfill that purpose, 
(4) impose religious restrictions on admissions, 
(5) require attendance at instruction in theology 
and religious doctrine, (6) require attendance at 
or participation in religious worship, (7) are an 
integral part of the religious mission of the 
sponsoring church, (8) have as a substantial or 
dominant purpose the inculcation of religious 
values, (9) impose religious restrictions on 
faculty appointments, and/or (10) impose religi-
ous restrictions on what the faculty may teach." 
Committee for Public Education and Religious 
Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (SDNY 
1976) • 
' .. No. 78-1369 - --
~/section 2281 was repealed by Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, 90 
Stat. 1119 (1976) but the repealer was inapplicable to any 
action, such as the present litigation, begun on or before 
August 12, 1976. Id., § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. 
-
-
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I/Because the District Court found in§ 9 of Chapter 507, 
as amended, "a clear statement of the legislature's intent to 
have the act remain in force as applied to nonsectarian schools, 
even if its application to sectarian schools were held to vio-
late the Establishment Clause," 414 F. Supp., at 1180 n.9, it 
declared Chapter 507 unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforce-
ment, only to the extent the statute authorized reimbursement to 
- sectarian schools. 
19 
II 
.J ... > 
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iON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
No. 78-1369. Decided May -, 1979 
PER CuRIAM . 
In 1973, this Court declared that Chapter 138, 1970 N. Y. 
Laws, under which the State of New York reimbursed non-
public schools for certain recordkeeping and testing costs, 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472 
(Levitt I). In the case now before the Court, the Committee 
for Public Education, et al., appeal the judgment of a three-
judge United States District Court that the successor statute 
to Chapter 138, namely, Chapter 507, as amended by Chapter 
508 (adding a severability provision) , 1974 N. Y. Laws, which 
attempts to avoid the defects of Chapter 138 while providing 
reimbursement to nonpublic schools for similar costs, does not 
offend the Establishment Clause. Committee for Public Edu-
cation and Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123 
(SDNY 1978) (Levitt III) . 
I 
Appellants, the Committee for Public Education and Reli-
gious Liberty and several of that organization's individual 
members, instituted this action in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York shortly after 
Chapters 507 and 508 were ena.cted by the New York Legisla-
ture in 1974. Appellees, defendants below, are the State 
Comptroller and the State Commissioner of Education. One 
nonsectarian and four sectarian private schools were permitted 
~ 
I~ 









2 COMM. PUBLIC EDUCATION v. REGAN 
to intervene as defendants, and they also appear as appellees 
in this Court. Appellants sought a declaration that Chapter 
507, like Chapter 138, is unconstitutional. and an injunction 
against the use of public money under Chapter 507 for the 
support of religious schools. 
The procedural history of this appeal properly commences 
with the Court's decision in Levitt I. As noted, the Court 
there considered the validity of Chapter 138, 1970 N. Y. Laws, 
unrkr which $28 million was appropriated to reimburse non-
public schools for costs incurred in administering tests, main-
taining pupil enrollment and health records, recording per-
sonnel data, and complying with certain state reporting re-
quirements. 413 U.S., a.t 474. The statute required no audit 
of actual expenses to be reirr:ibursed, nor did it provide for re-
coupment of reimbursement provided in excess of actual 
expenses for secular activities. 
This Court declared Chapter 138 unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause because the statute made no attempt, 
and no means were available, to assure that school-prepared 
tests for which reimbursement was available were free from 
religious instruction. Id., at 480. The Court held that the 
statute also was infirm because it provided aid to sectarian 
schools in the form of a lump sum payment for some services 
that were potentially religious without providing that this 
aid be limited to "an amount corresponding to the actual costs 
incurred in performing reimbursable secular services." Id., 
at 482. 
The New Yark Legislature responded to Levitt I by enacting 
Chapter 507, as amended by Chapter 508, in 1974. Chapter· 
507 provides that nonpublic schools in New York will be reim-
bursed by direct cash payments for certain incurred expenses 
Under the statute, nonpublic schools may seek payment for 
the actual cost to them of services "required by law to be ren-
dered to the state in compliance with the requirements of the· 
state's pupil evaluation program, the basic educational data 
system, regents examinations, the statewide evaluation plan, 
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other similar state prepared examinations and reporting proce-
dures." Chapter 507, § 3. 
Basically, § 3 provides reimbursement for costs incurred in 
two areas that had been covered by Chapter 138, record-
keeping 'and testing, whlle "limiting more narrowly than Chap:-
ter 138 did the specific costs reimbursable. Recordkeeping 
costs associated with fulfilling the State's requirement that 
annual attendance reports be nled with the State for ea.ch 
pupil are reimbursable, as are costs incurred in submitting to 
the State a Basic Educational Data System report, containing 
information on the faculty, physical plant, students, and 
curriculum of the nonpublic school. 
Testing expenses are reimbursable only with regard to cer-
tain examinations. These examinations are (1) the Pup1l 
Evaluation Program tests, administered in grades 3 and 6, 
and, at the school's option, also in grade 9; (2) Regents end-
of-the-course examinations administered in grades 9 through 
12 ; and (3) the Regents Scholarship and College Qualification 
Test (RSCQT), used to admit students to various units of the 
State University of New York and to award scholarships. All 
these tests are prepared by the State, though all are adminis-
tered in the nonpublic schools by employees of those schools! 
The Pupil Evaluation Program tests and Regents end-of-the-
course examinations are graded by nonpublic school personnel, 
though the State provides detailed instructions for both ad-
ministration and grading of these tests. The Pupil Evalua-
tion Program examinations are entirely objective multiple-
choice tests, and may be graded by hand or machine. Regents 
end-of-the-course tests, on the other hand, though made up 
largely of objective questions with multiple-choice answers, 
may contain essay questions or extended mathematical prob-
lems, and so require the exercise of some degree of subjective 
judgment by the sectarian employee grading them. Nonpub-
lic schools must submit all examination papers in certain sub-
jects to the State for review after certain examinations, but 
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other examinations. RSCQT examinations are scored by 
state employees. 
Costs that are reimbursable under Chapter 507 include 
proportionate shares of personnel salaries and fringe benefits 
attributable to the recordkeeping and testing covered by the 
statute, as well as the cost of supplies and certain contractual 
expenditures, such as those for electronic data processing, 
associated with covered activities. In order to qualify for 
reimbursement, nonpublic schools must submit to the State an 
application and such additional informa.tion as may be re-
quested. Ch. 507, § 4. Payment may be made only after 
t1'"' Prlueat.ion eommissi01wr i:i.uditf'l thf' application 9nrJ c 11n-
porting materials to determine whether reimbursement is 
proper. ld., ~~ b, 7. t,()JlOols seekiug rnnds uuJer Cha ter 
507 must maintain a separate a un mg system for expenses 
incurred in rendering services for which reimbursement ii::, pro-
vided, id., § 5, and the State is authorized to conduct periodic 
audits of these accounts to determine the cost to the school of 
rendering the services referred to in Chapter 507. Id., § 7. 
If an audit reveals that the school has received funds in excess 
of the actual coi::t of providing the specified services, the school 
must reimburse the State for the excess payments. Ibid. 
According to the evidence produced in the District Court, 
there are approximately 1,954 nonpublic s<>hools in New York 
eligible for reimbursement under Chapter 507. Of these, 85:% 
are religiously affiliated schools designed to provide an edu-
cation in which religious instruction is integrated with secular 
education, and in which the teaching process is largely devoted 
to religious inculcation.1 
C,,U 
1 In the District Court, appellees conceded that Chapter 507 would 
provide reimbursement to schools ·chat 
" ( 1) are controlled by churches or religious organizations, (2) have as their r u 
purpose the teachmg, propagation and promotion of a particular re!¢iot1s 
faith, (3) conduct their operations, curriculums and programs to fulfill that 
purpose, (4) impose religious restrictions on admissions, (5) require 
attendanco at mstruciion in theology and religious doctrine, (6) require at-
tendance at or participation in religious worship, (7) are an integral part 
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The District Court found that between $8-$10 million would 
be expended each year under Chapter 507, with most of this 
going to sectarian schools eligible for aid under the statute. 
Of this amount, it was estimated that 85o/o-95o/o would be paid 
for costs attributable to attendance-taking, of which all but a 
negligible portion would consist of compensa.tion to personnel 
performing this service. The funds paid for personnel ex-
penses incurred in attendance-taking would amount to ap-
proximately 1 o/o, to 5.4o/o of the budget of individual schools 
for salaries and fringe benefits. Levitt III, 461 F. Supp., at 
1126. 
II. 
A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2281, 2283.1 The parties agreed to submit the case on the 
pleadings and the appellees' answers to appellants' interroga-
tories. In its initial opinion, the District Court found Chapter 
507, as amended. to violate the Estabtishment Clause. Com-
mittee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 
414 F. Supp. 1174 (SDNY 1976) (Levitt II). In evaluating 
the statute, the court applied the three-part test, developed 
by this Court<}{ Establishment Clause cases, which looks to 
determine whether the legisla.tion has a secular purpose, 
whether it has a primary effect that enhances or inhibits reli-
gion, and whether it fosters government entanglement in reli-
gious affairs. The District Court unanimously concluded that, 
though the statute clearly had a secular purpose, it had the 
impermissible primary effect of advancing religion. Applying 
the principles of this Court's decision in Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U. S. 349 (1975) , the three-judge court found that the 
or dominant purpose the inculcation of religious values, (9) impose reli-
gious restrictions on faculty appointments, and / or (10) impose religious 
restrictions on what the facu lty may teach." Committee for Public Edu-
cation and Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (SDNY 
1976). 
2 Sect10n 2281 was repealed by Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976) 
but the repealer was inapplicable to any action , such as the present litiga-
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direct payments provided by Chapter 507 to religious schools 
would have the effect of aiding the sectarian enterprise, since 
the reimbursable secular activities of testing and reporting 
covered by the statute were essential to the educational func-
tion of the religious schools as a whole. 414 F. Supp., at 
1179- 1180.3 
On appeal, this Court, 433 U. S. 902 (1977) , vacated the 
District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the intervening decision in Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). On remand, a divided District 
Court, with Judge Ward , the author of the court's opinion in 
Levitt II, dissenting, reversed its field and found that Chapter 
507, as amended, could withstand Establishment Clause scru-
tiny. Levitt Ill, 461 F. Supp. 1123 (SDNY 1978). It read 
Wolman v. Walter to have cut back on Meek v. Pittenger by 
"reviv[ing] the more flexible concept that state aid may be 
extended to [a sectarian] school's educational activities if it 
can be shown with a high degree of certainty that the aid will 
only have secular value of legitimate interest to the State and 
does not present any appreciable risk of being used to aid 
transmission of religious views." 461 F . Supp. , at 1127. 
The District Court based this conclusion on its view that 
Wolman, by approving the Ohio policy of furnishing state-
drafted and state-graded examinations to religious schools, see 
433 U. S. , at 238-241 (plurality opinion) , had rejected the 
concept that state support for the secular educational activities 
of sectarian schools necessarily advanced the religious mission 
of such schools. The court first found the aid for adminis-
tering examinations provided for by Chapter 507 to be anal-
ogous to the examinations furnished by Ohio and at issue in 
3 Because the Dist rict Court found in § 9 of Chapter 507, as amended, "a 
clea r statement of the legislature's intent t o have the act remain in force 
as applied to nonsectarian schools, even if its application to sectarian 
schools were held to violate the Establishment Clause," 414 F . Supp ., at 
1180 n. 9, it declared Chapter 507 unconstitut ional, and enjoined its en-
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Wolman. Though Chapter 507, unlike the statute at issue in 
Wolman, reimburses religious schools for examinations ad-
ministered and graded by sectarian personnel, the court con-
cluded that the secular nature of the examinations and the 
mechanical grading procedures precluded use of the exami-
nations to inculcate religious views. And though Chapter 507, 
again unlike the statute in Wolman, involved direct cash pay-
ments to sectarian schools, the court held that so long as the 
payments were applied to purely secular activities, the reli-
gious mission of the schools was not advanced. The court 
then concluded that since attendance-taking was purely min-
isterial in nature, state reimbursement for costs associated 
with such an activity did not have a primary effect of advanc-
ing religion. Finally, the court rejected the argument that 
Chapter 507 fostered excessive government entanglement in 
religious affairs, finding that the services to be reimbursed 
were clear and discrete and that any possibility of fraud or 
mistake would be rectified by the careful auditing procedures 
called for by the statute. 
III 
The District Court, of course, was correct in recognizing 
that the "mode of analysis for Establishment Clause questions 
is defined by the three-part test that has emerged from the 
Court's decisions." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 235-236 
(plurality opinion) . To pass constitutional muster under this 
test, Chapter 507 "must have a secular legislative purpose, 
must have a principal or primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion, and must not foster excessive government 
entanglement with religion." Id., at 236. 
We have no trouble in agreeing with the District Court 
that Chapter 507 manifests a clear secular purpose. See 
Levitt I, 413 U.S. , at 479 n. 7. We therefore evaluate Chap-
ter 507 under the two remaining inquiries of the three-part 
test. 
In deciding whether Chapter 507 has an impermisible pri-
mary effect of advancing religion, or whether it fosters exces-
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keep in focus the nature of the assistance prescribed by the 
New York statute. The District Court found that $8-$10 
million annually would be expended under Chapter 507, with 
the great majority of these funds going to sectarian schools to 
pay for personnel costs associated with attendance reporting. 
The court found that such payments would amount to from 
1 o/o to 5.4 o/o of the personnel budget of an individual religious 
school receiving assistance under Chapter 507. Moreover, 
Chapter 507 provides direct cash payments by the State of 
New York to religious schools, as opposed to providing serv-
ices or providing cash payments to third parties who have ren-
dered services. And the money paid sectarian schools under 
Chapter 507 is designated to reimburse costs that are incurred 
by religious schools in order to meet basic state testing and 
reporting requirements, costs that would have been incurred 
regardless of the availability of reimbursement from the State. 
This direct financial assistance provided by Chapter 507 
differs significantly from the types of state aid to religious 
schools approved by the Court in Wolman v. Walter. For 
example, we approved in Wolman that portion of the Ohio 
statute that provided to religious schools the standardized 
tests and scoring services furnished to public schools. But, 
unlike New York's Chapter 507, Ohio's statute provided only 
the tests themselves and scoring by employees of neutral test-
ing organizations. It did not authorize direct financial aid 
of any type to religious schools. Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S., at 238-239, and n. 7 (plurality opinion). 
Similarly, the other forms of assistance upheld in Wolman 
did not involve direct cash assistance. Rather, the Court 
approved the State's providing secta.rian school students 
therapeutic, remedial, and guidance programs administered 
by public employees on public property. It also approved 
certain public health services furnished by public employees 
to religious school pupils, even though administered in part 
on the sectarian premises, on the basis of its recognition in a 
number of cases, see, e. g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 364, 
368 n. 17, that provision of health services to all school chil-
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1ishment Clause. 433 U. S. , at 241-248. And it upheld the 
lending by Ohio of textbooks to pupils under the "unique 
presumption," id., at 252 n. 18, created by Board of Edurotion 
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and reaffirmed since that time. 
E. g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. , at 359-362 (plurality 
opinion); id., at 388 (opinion concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) . 
It is clear, however, that none of. the programs upheld in 
W olrnan provided direct financial support to sectarian schools. 
At the least, then , the judgment of the three-judge court in 
Levitt I I I went further in approving state assistance to sec-
tarian schools than this Court has gone in its Establishment 
Clause cases. But beyond merely failing to approve the type 
of direct financial aid at issue in this case, Wolman reaffirme 
the finding of the Court ~ ek v. Pittenger that direct aid 
to the educational function of religious schools necessarily 
advances the secta.rian enterprise as a whole. Thus, the 
Court in Wolrnan invalidated Ohio's practice of loaning in-
structional materials directly to sectarian schools, "even 
though the loan ostensibly was limited to neutral and secular 
instructional material and equipment, [because] it inescap-
ably had the primary effect of providing a direct and substan-
tial advancement of the sectarian enterprise." Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U. S., at 250. In the same vein , the Court dis-
approved Ohio's provision of field-trip transportation directly ~~--=-~..:..:..;~-------
to reli ious schools as impermissible direct ai at, because of 
the pervasively nature of the schools involved, furthered the 
religious goals of the schools. a.nd that also required govern-
ment surveillance of expenditures to such a degree as to foster 
entanglement of the State in religion. Id. , at 252-255. 
Wolman thus re-enforces the conclusion that substantial 
direct financial aid to a religious school, even though osten-
sibly for secular purposes, runs a great risk of furthering the 
religious mission of the school as a whole because that reli-
gious mission so pervades the functioning of the school. The 
Court recognized this in Meek: 
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authorized by [the statute at issue] , it would simply 
ignore reality to attempt to separate secular educational 
functions from the predominantly religious role per-
formed by many ... church-related elementary and sec-
ondary schools and to then characterize [the statute] as 
channeling aid to the secular without providing direct 
aid to the sectarian. Even though earmarked for secular 
purposes, 'when it flows to an institution in which religion 
is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions 
are subsumed in the religious mission,' state aid has the 
impermissible primary effect of advancing religion. 
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743." 421 U. S., at 
365-366. 
See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S., at 249-250; Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 781-783, and n. 
39 ' (1973). 
Under the principles announced in these previous cases, we 
find that Chapter 507, by providing substantial financial as-
sistance directly to sectarian schools, has a primary effect of 
advancing religion. The vast majority of the schools aided 
under Chapter 507 typify the religious-pervasive institution 
the very purpose of which is to provide an integrated secular 
and sectarian education. The aid provided by Chapter 507 
goes primarily to reimburse such schools for personnel costs 
incurred in complying with state reporting and testing re-
quirements, costs that must be incurred if the school is to be 
accredited to provide a combined sectarian-secular education 
to school-age pupils. To continue to function as religious 
schools, sectarian schools th us are required to incur the costs 
outlined in § 3 of Chapter 507, or else lose accreditation by the 
State of New York. See, e. g., N. Y. Education Law §§ 3210, 
3211 (McKinney 1970). These reporting and testing require.! 
ments would be met by the schools whether reimbursement 
were available or not. As such, the attendance, informational, 
and testing expenses compensated by Chapter 507 are essential 
to the overall educational functioning of sectarian schools in 
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essential. Therefore, just as direct aid for ostensibly secular 
purposes by provision of instructional materials or direct fi-
nancial subsidy is forbidden by the Establishment Clause, so 
direct aid for the performance of recordkeeping and testing 
activities that are an essential part of the sectarian school's 
functioning also is interdicted. The Court stated in Meek, 
and reafffrmed in W olrnan: 
"The very purpose of many [religious] schools is to pro-
vide an integrated secular and religious education; the 
teaching process is, to a large extent. devoted to the incul-
cation of religious values and belief. See Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 616-617. Substantial aid to the 
educational function of such schools, accordingly, neces~ 
sarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as 
a whole. '[T]he secular education those schools provide 
goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the 
only reason for the schools' existence. Within the in-
stitution. the two are inextricably intertwined.' Id. , at 
657 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)." 421 u. s., at 366, 
quoted, at 433 U. S .. at 249-250. 
It is also true that the keeping of pupil attendance records 
is essential to the religious mission of sectarian schools. 'fo 
ensure tha.t the school is fulfilling its religious mission prop-
erly, it is necessary to provide a way to determine whether 
pupils are attending the sectarian calsses required of them. 
Accordingly, Chapter 507 not only advances religion by aiding 
the educational mission of the sectarian school as a whole; it 
also subsidizes directly the religious mission of such schools. 
Chapter 507 makes no attempt. and none is possible, to sepa-
rate the portion of the overall expense of attendance-taking 
attributable to the desire to ensure that students are attend-
ing religious instruction from that portion attributable to the 
desire to ensure that state attendance laws are complied with. 
This type of direct aid the Establishment Clause will not 
permit. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
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We thus hold that the aid provided by Chapter 507 con~ 
stitutes a direct subsidy of the operating costs of the sectaria11 
school that aids the school as a whole, and that the statute 
therefore directly advances religion in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Beyond this, Chapter 507 also fosters government entangle-
ment with religion to a impermissible extent. Unlike Wol-
man, under Chapter 507 secta.rian employees are compen-
sated by the State for grading examinations. In some cases1 
such grading requires the teacher to exercise subjective judg-
ment. For the State properly to ensure that the judgment i~ 
not exercised to inculcate religion, a "comprehensive, discrim-
inating, and continuing state surveillance will in~vitably be 
required." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4;03 V. S. 60'.2, (}19 (1971). 
Moreover, Chapter 507 provides for continuing reimburse-
ment with regard to examinations in which the questions maY. 
vary from year to _ year, and_ for examina.tions that may be 
offered in the future. This will require the State continually 
to evaluate the examinations. to ensure that reimbursement 
for expenses incurred in connection with their administrati01~ 
and grading will not offend the First Amendment. This too 
fosters impermissible government involvement in sectarian 
affairs, since it is likely to lead to continuing adjudication of 
disputes between the State and others as to whether certain 
questions or new exa1ninations present such opportunities for 
the advancement of religion that reimburse1nent for adminis-
tering and grading them should not be permitted. Cf. New 
York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). 
Finally, entanglement also is fostered by the system of 
reimbursement for personnel expenses. The State must make 
sure that it reimburses sectarian schools only for those per-
sonnel costs attributable to the sectarian employees' secular 
activities described in § 3 of Chapter 507. It is difficult to 
see how the State adequately may discover whether the time 
for which reimbursement is made available was devoted only 
to s,ecular J;1,ctivities without some type of ongoing surveillance 
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is this type of extensive entanglement that Establishment 
Clause forbids. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 617-621. 
We therefore conclude that Chapter 507 has a primary 
effect of advancing religion and also fosters excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion. The statute, conse-
quently, is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment, at least to the extent it provides 
reimbursement directly to sectarian nonpublic schools. The 
judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 






CH A MBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . B R EN N AN, JR. 
-.:§u:vr tmt cq curl cf flrt ~ h .:§tat.tg 
~iurfyingtcn. ,. Qj:. 20ffeJ!., 
May 29, 1979 
RE: No. 78-1369 Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Regan 
Dear Harry: 
I ag r ee with the Per Curi am you have prepared in 
the above. 
Mr. Justice Blac kmun 




0 '. j. 1-L L 
... 
\ 
<# ~ '1 - --
-
-
No. 78-1369 Committee for Public Education and Religious 
J.,iberty v. Regan 
!o : fhe Chie:f Justice 
Mr. Justice Brcnn _~n 
Mr . Justice st,3,nrt 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
llr. Justice Blackmun 
Ur. Justice Powell 
Yr. Justice R._ihnqulst 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
)1-rom: Kr. Justice White 
C1rculated: ,,r-, Ja - 7? 
Beoirculated: _____ _ 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
Any case requiring this kind of convoluted analysis, 
masquerading as an application of "principle" previously 
announced, is inappropriate for summary disposition and should 
be set for plenary consideration. The Court could then attempt 
to announce in a more clean-cut way the extent to which the 
public should be able to avoid sharing the expense of secular 
education for the substantial fraction of the young now re-
ceiving their training at so-called parochial schools. It is 
solely because the parents of these children believe that their 
offspring should be instructed in religion in connection with 
their schooling that they are taxed to support the public schools 
and hence the education of their neighbor's children, but are 
denied any help in providing secular education for their own. 
,, 




In this connection, it should be recalled that the 
First Amendment commands that Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. It was not until 1925 that this 
Court, in a dictum, suggested that the free speech protections 
of the Federal Constitution limit state legislatures as well 
as Congress; and it was still later, also by judicial divina-
tion, that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses were 
held applicable to the states. The Establishment Clause, at 
issue here, was first so applied in 1947 in Everson v. Board 
of Education, 333 U.S. 1. Since then, the states have with 
some consistency attempted to adjust to the peregrinations of 
this Court's holdings, but without noticeable success. It is 
time, it seems to me, for the Court to abandon its ideological 
fixations and accommodate itself to common notions of equity 
and fair play in construing and administering the majestic 
language of the First Amendment dealing with religion. 
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nouncecl, is inappropriate for summary disposition and should -be set for plenai;Y consideration. The Court could then 
attempt to announce in a more c1ean-cut way the extent to 
which the public should be able to avoid sharing the expense 
of secular education for the substantial fraction of the young 
now receiving their training at so-called parochial schools. 
It is solely because the parents of these children believe that 
their offspring should be instructed in religion in connection 
with their schooling that they are taxed to support the public 
schools and hence the education of their neighbor's children, 
but are denied any help in providing secular education for 
their own. 
In this connection. it should be recalled that the First 
Amendment commands that Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof. It was not until 1925 that this Court. in a 
dictum, suggested that the free speech protections of the 
Federal Constitution limit state legislatures as well as Con-
gress; and it was still later. also by judicial divination. that 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses were held ap-
plicable to the States. The Establishment Clause. at issue 
here, was first so applied in 1947, in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, 333 U. S. 1. Since then, the States have with some 
consistency attempted to adjust to the preregrinations of this 
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Court's holdings. but without noticeable success. It is time, 
it seems to me. for the Court to abandon its ideological fixa-
tions and accommodate itself to c01runon notions of equity and 
fair play in construing and administering the majestic lan-
guage of the First Amendment dealing with religion. 
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No. 78-1369, eorninttee · or · Publ1c · Education · and · Religious RE: 
-
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Liberty · v; · Regan-.3; &.--z- -.Id '~ ~"''?f l!t,.•..,~J.-~ ,,.-2-,:LC 
~ ~87'~--~~u,,f 
(2tJESTI0N • PRESENTEB: ~ / (3 t.. ~c;...c;...-~-u-:,~~w...-~---....., ~ _ / / 
Does a New York statute violate the Establishment Clause by 
authorizing reimbursement of expenses incurred by sectarian schools 
, ,...,.til~-= '· @d . . t . d d b © h . . -I-ctµ.,_~ a m1n1s er1ng state-prepare exams, an y ~) or1z1ng 
-
reimbursement of the expenses o~akinq attendance and preparing 
-.<• M4'~ •~ ~ 
attendance reports required by the State? 
I . BAeKf;R(:)tJNf): 
In Levitt ·· v; ·· eommi t tee ·· for - Public - Eda cat ion - and - Rel ig ioas 
Freedom, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), this Court struck down a New York 
statute permitting reimbursement of the costs to sectarian schools of 
administering exams, taking attendance and maintaining health record~] 
on the students. The law covered both state-prepared and teacher-
prepared tests. The Court found a violation of the Establishment 





eye, unconsciously or otherwise, to 
religious precepts of the sponsoring 
entire law was overturned because it 
• 
2. 
inculcate students in the 
church." Id. at 48 0. The 
involved a "single per-pupil 
allotment for a variety of specified services, some secular and some 
religious," and the courts could not segregate the funds for secular 
services from those for religious. Id. at 482. In subsequent 
litigation over funds that were due to the private schools before 
Levitt, this Court also pointed out that the statute at issue made no 
provision for state audit of how the sectarian schools used the 
money. Even if such an audit had been contemplated, the Court added, 
it would run afoul of this Court's position that the Establishment 
Clause bars any undue "entanglement" of the State with religious 
institutions: "This sort of detailed inquiry into the subtle 
implicatons of in-class examinations and other teaching activities 
would itself constitute a significant encroachment on the protections 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 11 }1ew · · Yor;k · · v; i-eathedral 
Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 132 (1974). 
In 1974 the New York Legislature moved to meet the Court's 
objections in a modified aid program. Chapters 507 and 508 of the 
1974 Laws provide for reimbursement of the "actual cost" of complying 
with State requirements for attendance reporting and the 
administration of State-prepared examinations ( such as the Regents 
examinations and the pupil evaluation program). Of the 23 
examinations covered under the law, all but two involve only 
multiple-choice questions or mathematical problems that are graded 
according to instructional manuals prepared by the state. The 




questions. The State reviews the grading of a random sample of 
completed exam papers every year, in order to enforce uniform 
standards. The law also authorizes reimpursements for preparation of 
Basic Education Data System (BEDS) reports on the student body, 
faculty, support staff, physical facilities, and curriculum of each 
private school. 
Schools seeking reimbursement must "maintain a separate 
account or system of accounts for the expenses incurred" in rendering 
the covered services, and must apply to the State Commissioner of 
Education for reimbursement. The State Controller is given power 
under the statute to audit the private schools to verify their 
reports. The state payments cover the proportionate shares of 
- teachers' salaries and fringe benefits attributable to administration 
of the examinations and to reporting of state-required data, plus any 
collateral expenses for supplies and the like. According to the DC, 
the annual payments to private schools under this program will be $8-
10 million, with 85-95 per cent of that amount going for the costs of 
-
attendance-taking. The attendance-related payments, the DC said, 
would constitute 1-5 per cent of the total amount budgeted by the 
private schools for salaries and fringe benefits. Eighty-five per 
cent of the 1,954 nonpublic schools in the sta~e have a religious 
affiliation. The payments should average between $4,000 and $5,000 a 
year per school. \ 
/. 
Petrs, who include the redoubtable Florence Flast ( as in 
v; · eohen), successfully challenged the statute. eommittee · for · Public 
Edacation ·· and ·· Religioos r· Liberty ·· v; ·· Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 





v;-~ittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the DC struck down the law on the 
I 
ground that it would have a principal or primary effect of advancing 
religion. Th is Court vacated the judgment and remanded in 1 ight of/ 
Wolman "" v; ·· Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). The DC reversed itself on 
remand by a 2-1 vote, perceiving in Wolman a retrenchment of the 
Court on aid to parochial schools. 
The DC majority applied the "now familiar tripartite test" 
for Establishment Clause questions: 1) The assistance program must 
have a "secular legislative purpose"; 2) It must not have a "primary 
effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion; and 3) It must not 
excessively entangle the government in the affairs of sectarian 
institutions. Juris. St. at A7. The first leg of the test was no 
- problem for the majority, which found that Chapters 507 and 508 
-
"clearly manifest[] a secular legislative purpose." Id. The 
"central issue" for the DC was whether the law passed the effect 
test. On the examination payments, the majority emphasized that the 
tests are prepared by the State and are graded mechanically except 
for a few essay questions. Consequently, the court found "any 
benefit to religious indoctrination from the administration of the 
State examinations by sectarian personnel is at best 'indirect' and 
'incidental' to the secular value of the exams." Id. at A12. 
Attendance-taking and other record-keeping functions, the majority 
continued, involve "essentially a ministerial task lacking 
ideological content or use." Id. at A14. Finally, the majority had 
no difficulty with the law's provision for direct payments to 
sectarian schools. Al though the Wolman Court noted the absence of 




majority insisted that the Supreme Court "has never declared a 
statute unconstitutional" because it established such payments. Id. 
at A 13. In addition, the court argued that aid to parochial schools 
for secular purposes could not be struck down because it might "free 
up" money for use for sectarian purposes. E.g., eommittee · for · Poblic 
Egacatiop · qnd · Religioas · Liberty · v; · Nyqaist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973). 
'\\ 
The majority disposed of the ~ntanglement issue with some 
dispatch. Attendance-taking and test-administration, the opinion 
stated, "are discrete and clearly identifiable," Juris. St. at A 1 6, 
so thete should be 1 it tle confusion in the private school records 
submitted for reimbursement. Because the services involved are 
"highly routinized," costs should not vary much from school to school 
- and the State should be able to tell easily when a school record is 
-
inaccurate. In any event, the majority added, "the careful auditing 
procedures anticipated by § 7 of the Statute should provide an 
adequate safeguard against inflated claims." Id. 
Judge Ward filed a dissent. He pointed out that Wolman did 
not involve direct aid to parochial schools, but only performance of 
certain functions by public employees. Indeed, the Wolman Court even 
struck down the loan of instructional materials and equipment which 
were "incapable of diversion to religious use." 433 U.S. at 251. 
Judge Ward argued that attendance-taking promoted both the secular 
and the sectarian educational goals of the institution, much like the 
payments for maintenance and repair services found unconstitutional 
in Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 774-80. The dissent also criticized 
the statutes for "requiring excessive governmental entanglement with 






religious values into the grading process of the few subjective 
sections of state-mandated exams, Judge Ward felt that the State 
would have to review all such exams. In addition, the dissent 
contended that on-site inspections would be required to check the 
private schools' claims as to the amount of teacher time devoted to 
attendance-taking and preparation of reports. 
Mr. Justice BLACKMON drafted a 13-page per·cariam reversing 
the DC and adopting the arguments of Judge Ward in dissent. Justices 
BRENNAN, MARSHALL and STEVENS joined the per·curia~, and Mr. Justice 
WHITE circulated a dissent. The Court then noted probable 
jurisdiction, although you voted with the CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices 
WHITE and REHNQUIST to affirm summarily. j u-,,ZJ~~ 
~ 
II. ISStJES: 
I see two distinct quest ions in this case: A) Under the 
"effect." leg of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, is 
there a bright-line rule against direct financial payments to 
parochial schools? B) Does the administration of the parochial 
school aid program raise an entanglement problem? 
A. Birect · Payments: In several cases, the question whether 
an aid program had the impermissible effect of advancing religion has 
been recast in terms of whether direct payments are made to private 
schools. Although this approach may be distorted by a strictly 
formal concern with whether the aid goes to the school or the 
students, the direct-payment theory captures the Court's concern for 
whether the aid program supports the entire sectarian institution, or 






to divorce completely any activity of a parochial school from its 
overall mission, but the _x?urt ~truggl;d to find a 1 ine between ~! 
aid that incidentally benefits the whole enterprise, and that which 
directly supports it. 
In large part, this quest ion turns on the Court's present 
view of the following passage in Meek-v;-Pittenger, sapra, 421 U.S. 
at 365-366. 
[F]aced with the substantial amounts of direct 
support authorized by [this statute], it would simply ignore 
reality to attempt to separate secular educational functions 
from the predominantly religious role performed by many •• 
church-related elementary and secondary schools and to 
then characterize [the statute] as channeling aid to the 
secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian. Even 
)
though earmarked for secular purposes, 'when it flows to an 
institution in which religion is so pervasive that a 
substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the 
religious mission,' state aid has the impermissible primary 
effect of advancing religion. Hant · v; · McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 
74 3. 
The statement would seem to lead to an almost automatic reversal or 
the DC in this case, since under the New York program $8-10 million 
]3~ ~ ~ ~-
every year will flow directly to parochial schoo,s.~~ s~ 
The DC felt that Wolman indicated a ~~a* ~h~h · 
problem. Wolman involved several forms of aid to sectarian schools: 
1) textbook loans directly to students; 2) provision of standardized 
tests to be administered and graded by the schools; 3) provision of 
speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic services by public 
employees, along with therapeutic services; 4) loans of instructional 
equipment (such as movie projectors, maps, etc.) to parents and 
students; 5) providing bus transportation for field trips. Al 1 but 
the last two forms of aid were upheld. The Court, per Mr. Justice 




textbooks, can be used for both secular and religious purposes. On 
field trip transportation, the Court had to distinguish Everson - v; 
Bd; ·,o:f · Ed;, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), which approved reimbursement toparents 
of parochial school children for the bus fare for going to school. 
The Court emphasized the control of the parochial schools over the 
terms of the field trips "their range, frequency, and 
destinations" and the involvement in them of teachers committed to 
the sectarian mission of the institution. 433 U.S. at 253-254. (Of 
course, that distinction makes little sense, since it attempts to 
differentiate the act of transporting students to a religious school 
from transporting the student after he has arrived at school. 
Parochial schools not only control the terms of the school day and 
It use that control to teach a religious message, but the teachers in 
them also play a major role in shaping the child's experience of the 
school day. ) Wolman concluded, however, that the transportation 
subsidy was "an impermissible direct aid to sectarian education." 
Id. at 254. 
I find nothing in Wolman that would undermine the putative 
bright-line test in Meek that direct payments to sectarian schools -
violate the Establishment Clause. Support for this position also 
~Jmes from your majority opinion in Nyqnist, which concerned, among 
,_-;ther things, direct payments to private schools for maintenance and 
~- ~ vv- repairs. Nyqnist, however, also emphasized that some direct payments 
~ 
may be acceptable under the First Amendment. "[S]ome forms of aid 
may be channeled to the secular without providing direct aid to the - sectarian. But the channel is a narrow one." 413 U.S. at 775. 




religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary schools," 
they were found to have more than an "indirect and incidental effect 
beneficial to religious institutions." Id. at 774, 775. 
In this case, the DC insisted that there is no obvious 
difference between offering services to private school children with 
~ - - - -
public personnel working on public premises -- as in Wolman -- and -..,,,..,_ ~ -- ..... L.-
paying for the costs of those specific secular services. This view 
ignores this Court's holding in~ that remedial services could not 
be offered by public personnel on nonpabl ic premises, because the 
service would be provided in "an atmosphere dedicated to the 
advancement of rel iq ious belief." 421 U.S. at 371. The Court's 
objection is not to provision of certain benefits to private school 
9 students, but to the context in which the publicly supported services 
-
are available. Public funds cannot be used to make a service 
available within the religious "atmosphere" of a sectarian school. 
Applying the direct-payment theory, I could not distinguish 
"' ,, . between the attendance-taking function in this case and maintenance -
and repair services subsidized in Nyqaist. Both are facially neutral 
activities that are essential to both the secular and sectarian 
functions of the school. Accordingly, I question whether the 
reimbursement for attendance-taking would survive under the Court's 
current approach. I would hold otherwise with respect to the 
expenses for administering state examinations. The exams are closely 
confined to secular matters and I see 1 it tle spillover from public 
support for those expenses to support of the entire religious 
institution. 






provide grounds for attacking state support for either the 
attendance-taking function or examination-administration. Because 
the exams are q iven once or twice a year on special days, it is a 
relatively simple matter to isolate those expenses for administering 
and grading the exams. State oversight of such record-keeping should 
be both simple and routine. And 21 of the 2 3 exams are graded 
mechanically, with no opportunity whatsoever for the inject ion of 
religious criteria. Although there might be some possibility for 
such injections with respect to the essay questions on the English 
and Social Studies Regents exams, that possibility would seem to be 
nominal, since the state provides instructions for proper grading of 
the essays and the essays are but a small part of the exams. The 
9 state's program of random monitoring of graded exams to ensure 
uniformity could conceivably involve some second-guessing by the 
state as to the religious values brought to the grading enterprise, 
but I would be inclined to view that danger as de · minimis. 
-
The attendance-taking also strikes me as a routine matter. 
I would imagine that a fairly uni form standard could be established 
for the percentage of a teacher's time that is ordinarily devoted to 
attendance-taking each day -- perhaps on the order of 3-5 per cent. 
Deviations above that norm might raise the need for more careful 
audit of the private school records, but that possibility seems 
sufficiently remote that I would not strike down the entire program 
on that ground. 
I am on the fence with respect to the 'feimbursements for the 
reports required under the BEDS • program. The costs of preparing 
-. - -w=- _ __,., "'"-t- ~ 




the variation in claims might lead to more extensive state auditing. 
The amount of the reimbursement, however, would likely be trivial. 
III. S5MMARY 
The New York law is vulnerable to Establishment Clause 
objections insofar as it provides support for attendance-takinq. The 
attendance function is a basic function of a school 
maintenance and repair activities involved in Nyquist 
like 
that 
supports both the secular and sectarian purposes of the school. 
Direct support of that activity in this situation, where most of the 
I 
$8-10 million a year would be for attendance-taking and reporting, 
cannot survive under the Court's present approach. The test-






·- ·- --- ..------- --
schools, but may be viewed 
activity designed to satisfy only state interests. 
- - ----- ~ ..... -
as a collateral 
Accordingly, I 
would uphold that portion of the statute. Finally, the entanqlement 
problem does not seem serious with respect to either attendance or 
test-administration, since the expenses for both should be relatively 
simple to keep track of and audit. The BEDS reports on general 
school functioning, however, are not so routine and miqht raise a 
more substantial entanglement question. 
- -
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTIC E HAR R Y A . B L AC K MUN J anuary 8, 1980 
✓ 
Re: No. 78-1369 - Committee for Public Education v. Regan 
Dear Byron: 
In due course, I shall prepare a dissenting opinion in 
this case. 
Mr. Justice Wh ite 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 9, 1980 
Re: 78-1369 - Committee for Public Education 
v. Regan 
Dear Byron: 
I shall wait for Harry's dissent. 
Mr. Justice White 





CHAMBE R S OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-
j,nprtm.t {!Jcurl cf tfrt ~h j,taftg 
... asfringhttt. ~- QJ. 21lffe~, 
✓ 
January 10, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1369 - Committee for Public Education 
and Religious Liberty et al. v. Regan 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
.~ 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
Janu~ry 1 O, 1980 
No. 78-1369 Comm. for Public Enucation v. R~qctn 
Df"ar Byron: 
Plt"as0 ioin me. 
Sini:!~rely, 
Mr. JusticP White 
Copies to the Conference 
LFP/lab 
No . 78-1369 Comm. for Public Education v . Regan 
Dear Byron: 
I think your opinion in this case is 0 xcellent, and 
have written you a separate ioin note. 
As you may have observed, my thinking about 
Establishment Clause caSPS has "mellowed" a bit ov~r th~ 
years, and in a broad sense my current thinking is r~flected 
in my concurring and c'lissenting opinion in Wolm.::in. I do not 
think that the sepa~ation of church ond state intenden to bP 
ensure~ by the Clouse is thrPatened in thP sliqhtest by t~e 
typP of state aid involved in this case . On th 0 0thP.r h3nd, 
I think we restrict liberty in gpneral when we pr 0 vent a 
state from takinq this kind of action to help preserve so~P 
fr~edom of choice ~s to where~ ana by whom - young peopl~ 
are educated. · 
You comment on one aspect of this in your 
footnote 8 where you express the sound view that political~ 
divisiven~ss ?lonq religious lines will not result from t~is 
type of state aid. I would WPlcome the addition to footnote 
8 of the thouqht that the Establishment Clause should not be 
construed so restrictively as to proscribe narrowly drawn 
leqis]ation that furthers the public inter~st in preservinq 
som~ diversity in P1ucation~l opportuniti~s, ~n<l in helpinq 
to assure that parochial ~nd other private schools meet 
mini~um stat~ educ~tional requirements . ! i touched on these 
t~oughts briefly in Wolman . 
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January 14, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1369, Committee for Pub. Ed. 
& Rel. Lib. v. Regan 
Dear Byron, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
1---;-> '; ' \ . -
/ ' 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
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January 29, 1980 
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Re: No. 78-1369 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. _Edward V. Regan 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
kl 
cc: The Conference 
- -
~u;vrtmt <!Jourt of tip• ~ ?t jstafts 
'lllasfringt.o-n. J. <!J . 21lffe'l,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE TH UR G OO D M A RSHALL J a nu a r y 29, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1369 - Committee for Public Education 
and Religious Liberty v. Regan 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Just i ce Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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January 31, 1980 
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Re: 78-1369 - Connnittee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Regan 
Dear Byron: 
I join. 
Mr, Justice White 
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